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TIBOR SZABÓ 
THE HUMAN BEING AS SUBJECTIVE FACTOR* 
(An ontological approach to Human being) 
"To be radical is to grasp the root of the 
matter. But for man the root is man 
himself." 
Marx 
1. Descriptive and normative modes of analysis 
The approach to the human being, by which is meant the most complex fact 
and process of reality, can be many folded. As a subject, it can be regarded from na-
tural, physiological or socialhistorical viewpoints, approached from angles of social 
consciousness, or viewed from ethical, religious or philosophical aspects. 
, Within the philosophical approach, two analytical modes can be differentiated : 
one describing the alienation, deprival and emptiness of human being, while the 
other — having separated the subject from history — formulates postulates concern-
ing it in an abstract way, starting from the notion of human being. The recognition 
and segregation of descriptive and normative analysis indicates an important task 
for research. 
2. Description of Human being in contemporary French Philosophy 
Looking at some examples more closely, a dominance of descritpive analysis 
can be seen in philosophical writings. This process started with structuralism whose 
representatives generally give man a very unimportant role in history. Let us just 
recall a few examples which express the general tendency represented by certain 
philosophical trends in connection with the humán being. 
Claude Lévi-Strauss in, his important — and as regards structuralism — basic 
work La pensée sauvage maintains that "l'histoire n'est pas liée à l'homme"1 and 
ulsö that it is a myth that man plays a "rôle d'agent historique"2 an assertion also 
made by J.-P. Sartre. Consequently, man does not play a part in history, the essence 
of which is described with the help of natural laws in preference to the process taking 
placé as a result of human action. The same thesis of Lévi-Strauss can be found again 
within marxism in the 70s when Louis Althusser in his paper Réponse à John Lewis 
puts forward his proposition of "theoretical anti-humanism". Opposing the huma-
. * This paper was accepted for poster presentation at the XVIIIth World Congress of Philo-
sophy, held in Brighton, August 1988; Due to financial reasons, however, the author could not 
travel to Great Britain, and could not discuss it with the participants of the Congress. 
1 Claude Lévi-Strauss: Lapensée"sauvage. Pion, 1962. Paris, p. 347. 
2 Idem, pv 337. 
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nist and historical tendencies of Marxism, and first of all Antonio Gramsci, Althusser 
started that history cannot be the result and outcome of a "développement individuel" 
but only that of class struggle which is nothing else but the "engine of history". This 
could be termed the case of the engine without a driver. A lot of discussion followed 
his statement in Remarque sur une catégorie: "procès sans Sujet ni Fin(s), namely 
that "l'histoire n'a pas au sens philosophique du mot, de sujet, mais un moteur: 
la lutte des classes."3 Similar thoughts occur — though from entirely different bases 
— in post-modern philosophy in the work of J.-Fr. Lyotard in the 80s. In his La 
condition postmoderne he explains that as we near the end of the 20th century an 
epoch is drawing to a close, one in which the dominant intellectual trends have been 
on the one hand the dialectics of Hegelian philosophy of Spirit and the other, the 
Marxian view of historical subjects as main postulates. Today we are witnessing a cri-
sis of power and knowledge nourished from these intellectual trends. The end of 
the epoch is due to the fact that the great ideals as set forth by Hegel and even more 
by Karl Marx have not materialized. Because of the insufficiency of historical subject 
the revolution imagined by him could not be carried out. On the possibilities of re-
volution Lyotard writes that "Quant à la revolution, au sens marxiste, ça me paraît 
exclu... Il me paraît parfaitement clair que le grand récit issu à la fois de l'idéalismé 
allemand et de la révolution française, récit de la réalisation du savoir et de l'émanti-
pation de l'humanité, repris par Marx et mixé avec la théorie économique, n'aura 
pas lieu. C'est ce que nous apprenons en cette fin de siècle, parce que. nous savons 
que quand il a prétendu avoir lieu, c'était une catastrophe... Les travailleurs eux-
mêmes, qui sont les sujets de ce récit, pensent, si l'on juge par leur conduite, que 
ça n'a pas lieu."4 Even if man were a subject, in the present situation the emancipa-
tion of his one subjectivity is impossible. 
The examples we have shown are taken at random. Still they illustrate that in 
the description of authors belonging to a variety of intellectual tendencies, the subject 
does not in effect fulfill the function it could fulfill in history. This may have widely 
differing historical reasons in various countries. 
May it be that one of the most important historical function of the human 
being — namely that of history creator — is really inactual? Should man not be the 
one to form history despite the fact that at the moment he is unable to fulfill his 
vocation? What sort of way out may occur from his present situation? These questions 
should be answered at least on the level of philosophical postulates. 
3. The normativity of the ontological approach to human being 
This question was touched upon by George Lukács almost parallel to the de-
velopment of structuralism. In his late philosophical masterpiece. Toward the Onto-
logy of Social Being (published in German in the mid-70s : no English translation has 
yet been made though some parts of it are aviable in English) he approaches the prob-
lem of man placed into a social being from two aspects: as Ideal moment and as 
Subjective factor. 
3(a) The importance of the Ideal Moment 
Lukács's starting point is of great significance in the history of philosophy. What 
he, wants to assert is a standpoint of tertium datur as opposed to Stalin's vulgar ma-
terialism and to modern irrationalism, to the various tendencies of idealism, such as 
3 Louis Althusser: Réponse à John Lewis, Maspéro, 1973. Paris, p. 39. 
4 Jean-Francois Lyotard: Le jeu de l'informatique et du savoir, dialectiques, 1980. n. 29, p. 9. 
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existentialism, neopositivism etc. In his case this means a return to Marx who already 
in his Thesen über Feuerbach separates his views from traditional, contemplative 
materialism and from the various trends of subjective idealism alike.5 
What — then — does this viewpoint of tertium datur mean concerning the ideal 
moment in Lukács? 
Lukács — taking into consideration the failure of Stalinian conception and the 
dead-end of modern idealism — forwards the necessity of a unified view of the human 
being based fundamentally on the idea of historical being and he does this in a way 
highly original in the history of philosophy. In contrast to various modern philoso-
phical trends which concretize and divide the different aspects of the human being, 
Lukács strives to create a new synthesis of the spiritual and material in the social 
being. He points out that in the model of human activity, namely in work, ideal and 
material moments, teleology and causality exist in an inseparable unity. He said: 
From the ontological point of view, it is not about two separate acts — one ideal 
and one material — but the possibility that each act, to be isolated from each other 
only conceptually, is bound to the existence of the other by ontological necessity. In 
the most proper activity of man, a dialectic unity of ideal and real elements can be 
observed. In this manner, according to Lukács's conception, the ideal moment is 
highly evaluated. He supplies us with expressive examples concerning the everyday 
importance of the ideal moment which reveals 'the muteness' of the an sich Sein. 
A stick, for example, is suitable in itself to be used as a spit, yet its own being would 
never reveal this suitability. Another example : in the case of the most primitive human 
appliance of fire, it directly is obvious that neither the fire posesses a capacity for 
cooking or baking, nor does the meat or the vegetable have a direct tendency for 
being cooked or roasted. The für Sich being of social beings consequently has to be 
sought in the suitability or insuitability of the ideal moment. Man is capable of 
reaching his dépendance from nature and society solely by concrete activity forming 
society based on the ideal moment. 
This is how this question is linked with the problem of ideology, which serves 
in Lukács's opinion "as a means to make the social practice of men conscious and 
apt to act". Ideologies promote choice in social life, based on the ideal moment, 
and further men in undertaking social conflicts. Thus, ideology and socio-political 
activity are closely related in Lukács. Despite his failure to elaborate on the poli-
tical sphere, on the question of social structure, of state and civil society, this emphasis 
on the ideal moment — on the normative level — helps the human being to be seen 
more clearly and in greater totality. 
3(b) The role of the subjective factor in history 
Man — in Lukács's view — is an 'answering being', unable to free himself of the 
questions history poses him and characterized as a human being by his answers to 
these questions. The answer always reflects the age and also the human possibilities. 
In certain cases, Lukács attaches decisive importance to the historical role of 
the human subject until then long disregarded in Marxist philosophy. He considers 
the subjective factor as having critical, special importance in the recognition and 
pursuit of social conflicts, for in one form or another, man has always been a determin-
ing factor of great historical changes. Opposed to the official Marxist views, Lukács 
5 Karl Marx: Thesen über Feuerbach — in: Marx—Engels: Ausgewählte Schriften. Diez 
Verlag, 1966. Berlin, II. Band, p. 371. 
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underlines the notion that historical change is not merely a mechanic, automatic 
result, a consequence arising from the conflict between the development of the forces 
of production and the backwardness of the relations of production, but also a result 
of the 'changing activity' of people. Furthermore, the ideal moment also plays a role 
in the practical activity of the subjective factor. "Es ist die grosse, welthistorische 
Lehre der Revolutionen, dass das gesellschaftliche Sein sich nicht bloss verändert, 
sondern immer wieder verändert wird."6 The historical role role of the subjective 
factor therefore influences the judgement of economical changes in society. In Lu-
kács's view, "die ökonomische Entwicklung zwar objektiv revolutionäre Lagen 
schaffen kann, jedoch bringt sie keineswege mit ihnen simultan in zwangsläufigen 
Zusammenhang den faktisch und praktisch ausschlaggebenden subjektiven Faktor 
hervor."7 
The formation of the subjective factor is therefore a historical task. It is hindered, 
at the moment, by alienation, a phenomenon introduced in detail in descriptive ana-
lysis, which is present on the level of the human being, in ideas and institutions all 
over the world. Lukács himself, in the personality-theory section of his Ontology, 
mentions the obstacles to the development of the human being. He says that persona-
lity can defeat its alienation and can become a subjective factor only if day by day 
it fights its own alienation and — we might add — the conditions which continuously 
produce alienated relations. 
4. Conclusions 
The descriptive and normative modes of approach actually correspond to the 
standpoints of'Sein' and 'Sollen'. Strictly speaking, none of these analytical methos 
is expedient : the descriptive angle does not show a way-out, while the normative one 
suggests slightly utopie solutions, at least from present perspectives. 
Despite all this, we maintain that a search for the way-out is necessary when 
studying the human being. One of the preconditions is a realistic and many-sided 
description of the human being. At the same time, a requirement is that we consider 
the possibilities of man as a species. It is obvious that we can obtain only expressedly 
abstract conclusions as a result of a normative analysis, yet the ontological approach 
nevertheless has a great advantage. Namely* the unified aspect, the way it observes 
and handles man embedded in his social being. This is in contrast to the isolation 
of the ideal and material moment, which undoubtedly results in a onesided interpre-
tation. Lukács, with his ideas of tertium datur provides a good example of how this 
pattern of the history of philosophy, hitherto stiffened into a rigid dichotomy, can 
be exceeded on the basis of a unified vision of social existence and social conscious-
ness. At the same time, he also shows how a harmony of the ideal and the material 
is possible in a human-centric conception without always searching for the, priority 
of one over the other. 
Finally, there is a further conclusion: The subjective factor really is unable to 
fulfill its historical role. Yet this does not involve the non-existence of the subjective 
factor. It does exist, but is deformed and manipulated. The way-out can once more 
® Georg Lukács: Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins. Luchterhand, 1986. Darmstadt 
und Neuwied, Die wichtigsten Problemkomplexe, p. 453. 
7 Idem. p. 453. See my paper: Két filozófiai szintézis-kísérlet: Lukács és Gramsci (Two tentati-
ves of philosophical synthesis). Doxa, no. 7. 1986. pp. Ill—124. 
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be produced on the normative level. The subject is able to fill its role only if the aliena-
ted state comes to an end and the regulative system and institutional relations of the 
civil society fill its place. 
Szabó Tibor 
AZ EMBER MINT SZUBJEKTÍV TÉNYEZŐ 
(Az ember ontológiai szempontból) 
A tanulmányt a szerző a XVIII. brightoni Filozófiai Világkongresszusra készítette. Bár az anya-
got elfogadták, ott mégsem mutathatta be, mert nem tudott kiutazni. 
A tanulmányban a szerző bemutatja, hogy az 1960-as években a francia filozófiában, a struktu-
ralizmustól egészen az 1970-es években jelentkező posztmodern filozófiáig, az ember deskriptív, le-
író elemzési módját lehet megfigyelni. Ezzel szemben az ugyancsak ez időtájt született Lukács-írá-
sokban az ember fogalmának normatív bemutatása történik meg. Ennek talán legfőbb vonása, 
hogy — eszmei és anyagi mozzanatok egységét hangsúlyozva — azt mutatja be, milyennek is kell 
lennie az embernek, mint nem-elidegenedett lénynek. A tanulmány szerzője egyik tárgyalási móddal 
sem azonosítja saját felfogását, s hangsúlyozza, hogy kiutat is felmutató új szintézisre van szükség 
e téren. 
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